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CURRENT DECISIONS
Anmy Aim NAvy-DRAFrr Ac --- W!AR MmaaIAGE DOES NoT EXEmPT
DRtanE.-The petitioner, having been directed to report for military service,
sought by certiorari to review the action of a District Board which had placed
him in Class i. He had claimed deferred classification as a married man but
his marriage took place June 27, 1917. Section 72, rule 5, of Selective Service
Regulations directs draft boards to scrutinize marriages contracted since May
18, 1917, and to determine whether such marriage was entered into with a
view to evading military duty, "and unless such is found not to be the case"
to disregard the marriage in the classification of the registrant Held, that the
petitioner was properly classified, since the registrant must prove affirmatively
that his marriage was not contracted with a view to evading the draft. Boifano
v. District Board (1918, N. D. Cal.) 25o Fed. 812.
So-called "war marriages" gave the local draft boards much trouble. This
decision seems clearly correct Indeed, as the court says, the discharge of the
petitioner's writ might have been rested upon the finality of the finding by an
administrative board such as are the draft boards. See (1918) 27 YALB LAW
JoUR1AL, 683, at 686.
ATToannYs-PowERs AND COMPENSATION-APPOINTMENT BY COUR' TO PRT=
INTREST orF SoLDmaR DEFENDANT.-Pursuant to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act (Act Cong. Mar. 8, i918), an attorney was appointed by the court
to represent and protect the interest of a defendant who was in military service.
Questions as to the attorney's authority to serve a notice of appearance for the
defendant, and as to his compensation were presented on motions. Held, that
while the appearance of such attorney might properly be noted at any stage
of the proceeding, he had no right to serve a notice of appearance or answer
binding upon the absentee; also that no provision was made by the laws of
New York for compensation for services rendered by such attorney. Davison
v. Lynch (x918, Sup. Ct. Sp. T.) 171 N. Y. Supp. 46.
The general features of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act were dis-
cussed in (1918) 27 YA.E LAw JouRNAL, 8oz. The principal case appears to be
the first reported decision construing the Act in respect to the questions here
involved. As to the first point, the- subject is clearly covered by the terms of
the Act that "no attorney appointed under this Act . . . shall have power
to waive any right of the person for whom he is appointed or bind him by
his acts." On the subject of compensation the court says that "every member
of the bar should regard it as his patriotic duty to devote his best efforts to
the protection of a defendant in the military service regardless of compensa-
tion." To this call the profession is certain to make a patriotic response.
BuiLs AND NOTES-PAYEE AS HOLDER iN DuE CousE--Erncr OF N. I. L--The
defendant endorsed for accommodation a note in which the name of the payee
had not been filled in. His endorsement was obtained by the fraudulent delivery
to him of a worthless mortgage as security, and by the false promise of the
maker's agent that the plaintiff's name should not be inserted as payee. The
note was complete when delivered to the plaintiff, who took it in good faith in
settlement of a claim against the maker. The plaintiff recovered judgment and
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the defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment was correct, as the payee
of this promissory note was a holder in due course. Johnston v. Knipe (i918,
Pa.) 103 Ati. 957.
That a payee might be a holder in due course at common law was undoubted.
Whether he may still be such under the N. I. L. depends on whether see. 3o
(original notation) is held by its enumeration to exclude every other form of
negotiation, such as, e. g., that to a payee. Here, as in other connections, the
saner and sounder result seems to be obtained by regarding the N. I. L. not as
a codification intended to be exhaustive, but as legislation which left the common
law in force in aU points not fairly covered by the language of the statute. See
Comments (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOuRNAL., 686. The instant case applies this
salutary principle. There is not over-much authority on the precise point. See
(I915) 24 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 429, and (igi8) 27 ibid. 558.
CONTRAcrs-DEFENSES-EmEMIC OF IxFAN=I.E PARALYSIS EXCUSING NoN-
PERFORANc--The plaintiffs agreed to manage and provide prizes for a baby
show at Charter Oak Park in Hartford on September 6, x916. The defendant
promised to supply a room for the show and to pay the plaintiffs $6oo. About
the middle of August the defendant notified the plaintiffs that it wished to cancel
the contract because of an epidemic of infantile paralysis which would make it
dangerous to health to hold the baby show at the time proposed. To an answer
setting up these facts the plaintiffs demurred. Held, that the defense was good,
since the holding of the proposed show under the circumstances would, as matter
of law, be contrary to public policy, and therefore the abandonment of it upon
such contingency was an implied term of the contract. Two judges dissenting.
Hanford et al. v. Connecticut Fair Ass'n (1918) 92 Conn. 621, IO3 AtL 838.
The dissenting judges in a very persuasive opinion combat the broad principle
that whenever an otherwise lawful act becomes dangerous to public health
because of an external temporary condition it automatically becomes contrary
to public policy and therefore unlawful, without any statute or order from health
officials declaring it to be so.
CoNsTiTUTIoAL LAw-INDIANA PROHIBrrION LAW VALI.-The Prohibition
Law of Indiana (Acts 1917, ch. 4) prohibits the manufacture, sale, gift, adver-
tisement or transportation of intoxicating liquor except for certain specified
purposes. The plaintiffs, brewers, sought an injunction to restrain the super-
intendent of police of an Indiana city from enforcing the law, on the ground
that it violated the state constitution. Held, that the law was a valid exercise
of the police power. Spencer, J., dissenting. Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing
Co. (1g18, Ind.) i2o N. E. i9.
This case is of interest for the reason that almost alone among the authorities
stands the case of Beebe v. State (855) 6 Ind. 5oi, holding that the state legis-
lature had no power to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors.
The principal case overrules that decision. Mr. Justice Spencer dissented not
merely on the ground of stare decisis but upon what he believed to be sound
constitutional principles.
CouRTs-Cmcurr CouRT OF APPEALs-FoLLowiG PREcDENTS FRom OTHER
CiRcurr CouRTs.-The state of Arkansas imposed an annual tax on a railroad
company for the privilege of exercising its franchise within the state, making the
tax a first lien on the property of the corporation, whether in its own hands or
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those of an assigne receiver, etc. Receivers were appointed in a creditors' 
sut.
The state intervened, praying that the receivers be ordered to pay the franchise
taxes for the years since their appointment, with the penalties for non-payment.
From such an order the receivers appealed. Held, that the order was correct,
the court following a decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals 
of another
Circuit decreeing payment of the taxes and penalties. Bright v. State of 
Arkao-
sas (xg8A C. C..A. 8th) 249 Fed. 950.
In view of the conflict of authority on the point at issue, the court 
followed
by preference a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit.
Its sane pronouncement on such action is worthy of note. "In deciding 
questions
of policy and practice which involve no vital moral issue, certainty 
in the law
and uniformity of decision are often more essential to the 
wise administration
of justice and to the interests of business men than a 
particular policy or
practice. Where the correct decision of such a question is 
doubtful, and one of
the United States Circuiz Courts of Appeals has decided 
it in a considered
opinion, it is the duty of the others to follow that decision, 
unless it clearly
appears to them, or to some of them, to be unfair or unwise, and 
it is the duty
of the courts at all times; in the consideration of such 
issues, to lean towards
uniformity of decision and practice."
CouRTS-MArrAL--PERsoNS SUBJECr TO MnIITARY LAW-CDOOK 
UPON AaMY
TwAspr.--The petitioner, a civilian, was employed in time of 
war by the
U. S. Quartermaster's Department and was assigned as cook upon 
an army
transport lying at the Bush Terminal, Brooklyn. Just before 
the ship was to
sail le aftempted to desert, was arrested by military police and 
held for trial
by court-martial. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Held, that he
was "a person serving with the armies of the United States in 
the field" and
therefore was subject to military law and to trial by court-martial. 
EX parte
Fall (x8, D. N. J.) 251 Fed. 4i5.
In holding thzt service "in the field" may be performed at any 
place, whether
on land or on water, where such service is required for the good 
of the regular
army, the court gives a liberal but sensible interpretation to section 
a of the
Articles of War. The decision finds support in Ex parte Gerlack 
(1917, S. D.
N. Y.) 247 Fed. 616, noted in (x9xS8) 27 YAI LAw JouRNAL, 6&
GAR-IsnmE-FzsC? or GovsaRmm Co=x0L oF RAILRADS 
Fox WAR
Puaposzs.--In an action against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company 
certain
other railroads were summoned on January 2% Tgi8, as garnishees. 
Prior
thereto all the companies had been taken under federal control pursuant 
to the
President's Proclamation of December 26, xxq. The garnishees admitted 
traffc
balances owing to the Pennsylvania but contended that they could 
not be sub-
jected to garnishment because of that provision of the Proclamation 
which
d*11ared that "except with the prior written consent 
of [the Director General],
no attachment by mesne process or on execution shall be levied on 
or against
any of the property used by any of said transportation systems 
in the conduct
of their business as common carriers. . .
" Held, that such traffic balances
were not subject to garnishment. Dooley v. Pennsylvatia RaUroad Co. 
et al.
(xg8, D. Minn.) 250 Fed. x42.
The legality of the above quoted provision of the President's Proclamation
was questioned in a dictum in Muir v. Lousville & N. R. R. Co. 
(xgx8, W. D.
Ky.) 247 Fed. 888, 896 The principal case sustains it 
as incidental to the
general power to take possession of the railroads conferred 
upon the President
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by act of August 29, 19x6. 39 U. S. Stat. at L. 645. If this be sound, the deci-
sion that traffic balances form part of a revolving fund which is as necessary
to the operation of the road as are cars and engines, seems also correct.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-AcTIONABLE WORDS-STATEMENT THAT CANDIDATE FOR
O'icE IS NOT A CITIZEN.-The defendant published in its paper a statement that
the plaintiff, who was a candidate for the office of village clerk, was not a citizen
of the United States. Citizenship was a requisite of eligibility to the office in
question; the plaintiff was a naturalized citizen. Held, that under the circum-
stances the words were libelous. Maclnnis v. National Herald Printing Co.
(1918, Minn.) 67 N. W. 550.
The decision seems clearly correct. As the court said, there was no need to
find a case precisely in point. The meaning of language depends, of course,
upon the circumstances under which it is uttered. While the words in cfuestion
under ordinary circumstances would clearly not be libelous, it is equally clear
that as here used they charged the plaintiff with seeking an office for which he
was ineligible, and thus lessened him in public esteem and confidence. It should
be noted that the appellate court sustained a verdict for punitive damages, on
the ground that the circumstances attending the publication of the statement
showed "actual malice."
RECORDING Acrs-NonicE BY RECORD-MORTGAGE RECORDED IN WRONG COUNTY
COMMONLY BELIEVED THAT IN WHICH LAND WAS LOCATED.-A mortgage was
recorded in the county in which it was commonly believed the mortgaged land
was situated. The mortgage deed described the land as in that county. Later
the Supreme Court decided that the strip of land of which the mortgaged
property was a part was in another county. Subsequently the mortgagor con-
veyed to a purchaser who had no actual notice of the mortgage. This grantee
recorded his deed in the county where the land was. Still later the mortgage
was also recorded in that county. In the present action for foreclosure of the
mortgage the defendant claimed title under the deed first recorded in the proper
county. Held, that the record of the mortgage in the county commonly believed
to be the one in which the land was situated was constructive notice to subsequent
purchasers. Whiting, P. J., dissenting. Hulsether v. Peters (1918, S. D.) 167
N. W. 497.
There is apparently little authority upon the point. The principal case is in
accord with the view taken in Stewart & Theus v. Walsh (1871) 23 La. Ann.
56D. A strict construction of the language of the recording acts, however,
would lead to the opposite conclusion. Adams v. Hayden (1883) 6o Tex. 223.
If the object of recording is to give intending purchasers opportunity to
examine into the title, the decision seems sound, for obviously they would
examine the records of the county in which the community believed the land to
be situated. The only doubtful point is raised by the fact that plaintiff, a
non-resident, failed to record the mortgage in the proper county for nearly
two years after the Supreme Court's decision settling the boundary, and it was
during this interval that the subsequent grant was made. However, it may well
be argued that intending purchasers who knew of the decision, ought to examine
the records of the county in which the community previously supposed the land
lay. If so, the result reached is sound.
ToRTS-PICKETING-INuNCTIoN AGAINST PICKETING BY UNION WORKMEN.-
Upon the plaintiff's refusal to unionize his restaurants, most of his employees
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went out on strike and caused his places of business to be "picketed." The
pickets patrolled the sidewalks in front of his premises and carried placards
reading, "This caf6 is unfair to union labor." There was some evidence of
disorder and of attempts to intimidate patrons. The plaintiff's business fell off
largely. An injuction was issued forbidding, among other things, picketing or
patrolling the sidewalks adjacent to the plaintiff's premises with such placards,
or dissuading persons who sought to enter the premises from patronizing or.
working for the plaintiff. Held, that the injunction was properly granted. Two
judges dissenting. Local Uilion No. 3r3, etc. v. Stathakis (1918, Ark.) 2o5
S. W. 450.
The subject of enjoining picketing had not before been passed upon by the
Arkansas court. The opinion lays down the principle that a labor union which
is on strike is privileged to give publicity to that fact but, in doing so, must not
disregard the "right of the employer to employ whom he pleases" and to carry
on business with the public free from coercive molestation. The actual decision,
affirming the sweeping injunction, seems in fact to go beyond this principle and
to forbid any kind of picketing immediately adjacent to the premises. Picketing
there, the court treats as per se coercive; while picketing at a distance "gives
the member of the public whose support is thus solicited an opportunity for
reflection." That picketing is per se coercive is likewise held in Webb v. Cooks,
Waiters' etc. Union (1g18, Tex. Civ. App.) 2o5 S. W. 465.
TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST-ORAL PROMISE OF HEIR TO HOLD LAND IN
TRUST -The plaintiff was sole heir to her father. The latter when about to
die asked plaintiff to promise to divide all his property equally between herself
and the defendant. The plaintiff so promised, assuring the father that no will
would be necessary to carry out his wishes. Defendant knew nothing about the
promise until after the death of the father and the probate of the will. The
plaintiff purchased with a portion of the funds, not amounting to half, a piece
of real estate and placed defendant in possession of the same, stating at the
time that she gave it to her. In no other way did she give the defendant any
portion of the property inherited from the father. Plaintiff, who had never
conveyed the legal title'to the land, brought the present action to recover pos-
session of the same. Held, that plaintiff had only a bare legal title and was
not entitled to possession. Barrett v. Thielen (rx98, Minn.) 167 N. W. 1o3o.
The court reached its conclusion on the following grounds: (I) that an heir,
who makes an oral prolnise to his ancestor to dispose of the property for the
benefit of certain persons and thereby leads the ancestor to refrain from making
a will, is in equity a constructive trustee for the intended beneficiaries; (2) that
the land in question was therefore purchased with funds and under the circum-
stances belonged in equity to the defendant; (3) that under Minnesota code
procedure an "equitable title" may be set up as -a defense to an action for pos-
session brought by the holder of a "legal title without beneficial interest."
The view of the court as to the first point is the prevailing one. (1918) 27
YALE LAw JoURNAL, 389. It was applied in the recent case of Aratson v. First
Nat. Bank (igi8, N. D.) 167 N. W. 76o. The second proposition follows if the
first be admitted. Upon the third point the law in Minnesota differs from that
in many, perhaps most, code jurisdictions. See (1917) 26 YALE LAw JousNAL,
592-
TRUsTs-UNINcoRPORATED AssocIATIoNs-DIsPOSTIoN OF PROPERTY ON DIssoLU-
TIoN.-Funds were held in trust for a constantly changing group of bene-
ficiaries-injured employees of a mining company and their dependents in case
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of death. The company and each employee contributed to the fund. On leaving
the service of the company an employee ceased to have any claim, for injury or
death benefits. The company went out of business, at which time there was
on hand in the fund nearly $55,ooo. Those who were employees when the com-
pany ceased doing business claimed that the whole fund was held in trust for
them; the company claimed that a resulting trust for it existed for a share pro-
portioned to its contribution; persons previously employed also made claims
for shares. The plaintiff, trustee of the fund, filed a bill of interpleader. Held,
that there were resulting trusts in favor of all who had at any time contributed
to the fund, in proportion to the contributions of each. Walters v. Pittsburgh
& Lake Angeline Iron Co. (I918, Mich.) x67 N. W. 834.
The agreements entered into by the contributors in this case were not very
definite and no provision was made for the distribution of any surplus. The
decision follows the view taken in the case of Coe v. Washington Mills (1889)
149 Mass. 543, 21 N. E. 966, upon the principle that where an express trust
comes to an end without exhausting a fund, there is a "resulting trust" for
the grantor. If there is anything in the agreement of the contributors which
indicates an intention that no trust shall result-as may well happen in cases
similar to the one in hand-that intention will be given effect. See In re Customns
& Excise Officers Fund [1917] 2 Ch. i8, commented upon in (1918) 27 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 418.
Wn.Ls-TEsTAmENTARY CAPAcITY-SoLDER UNDER AGE ExERcIsixG PowER OF
APPoiNTMENT BY WILL.-An English officer under age, while on active service
with the army, made his will, duly executed and attested, by which he exercised
a power of appointment over personal property. After the will was admitted
to probate, proceedings in chancery were instituted by persons who would be
entitled to the property if the power were invalidly exercised, claiming the will
was void. Held, that the power was validly exercised. Re Wernher (1918,
C. A.) 118 L T. 388.
The same decision had been reached by the lower court, but Younger, J.,
there expressed the opinion that the practice of the Probate Court of admitting
wills of infant soldiers was not warranted by the Wills Act of 1837. See Com-
ment in (i918) 27. YALE LAw JOURNAL, 8o6. Following the handing down of
this opinion the Wills (Soldiers' and Sailors') Act of February 6, 1918, was
enacted "in order to remove doubts as to the construction of the Wills Act of
1837." It declared that Section II of that Act had always authorized the
infant soldier in actual military service to dispose of his personal estate by
will. This legislation, the court now says, puts to rest the question of the
validity of the will; and it was held also that the power to dispose of "his
personal estate" included the power to appoint personal estate. In America it
would seem that such retroactive legislation could hardly be sustained. If the
will were invalid at the time of the testator's death, any subsequent statute
declaring it operative would run foul of constitutional prohibitions. See Green-
ough v. Greenough (1849) 11 Pa. St. 489.
